

SECRET

9 May 50

Assistant Director for Special Operations

Assistant Director for Operations

Clearance of British Personnel Assigned to FBIS Stations

REF : Memorandum dated 2 May 1950 to ADO from ADSO, subject as above

1. The proposal outlined in paragraph 5 of reference is acceptable to this office and has been concurred in by the Chief, IASS.

2. The Chief, FBID, has been authorized to correspond directly with the Head, EEC Monitoring Service, in implementing the details of this proposal.

/s/



CONCURRENCE:

/s/ Sheffield Edwards
Chief, IASS

OO:FB:LEW:hmq
8 May 1950

Distribution:

Addressee 0 & 1
OO - 2
IAS - 1
Ret to FBID - 1

The arrangement for security clearance of EEC personnel posted with FBIS is a personal arrangement with Mr. Frost and approved by Major General Sir Ian Jacob. All dealings of any nature whatever should be with Mr. Frost personally and if for any reason whatever he is no longer Head of the EEC Monitoring Service and accessible to clear such information the entire arrangement should be reexamined.

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MAY 2 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Clearance of British Personnel Assigned to FBIS Stations

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 14 March 1950 to AD/CO from AD/CO

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1. [redacted], Chief, FBIS, London, advised that security clearance procedures to be established pertained to employees of the British Broadcasting Corporation who are to be attached to FBIS, Washington, and to FBIS stations rather than to British personnel hired directly by FBIS. Clearance procedures for the latter class have previously been established and are functioning satisfactorily, according to [redacted]

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2. At a meeting Mr. Malcolm A. FROST, Head, NSC Monitoring Service, [redacted] discussed security clearance procedures and CIA policy decisions concerning these procedures.

3. Mr. FROST was agreeable to the request that names of NSC designees for attachment to FBIS and/or FBIS stations be submitted sixty (60) days in advance. The requirement that British Security Service certificates be obtained on these designees was also acceptable to Mr. FROST.

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4. Subsequent meetings between [redacted] and British Security Service officials revealed that the British Security Service will not provide written certificates of security clearance. Their reasons are:

- a) They do not provide any British agency with a certificate of security clearance either for candidates for employment or for employees;
- b) Each British agency is responsible for its own security including clearance of personnel; and
- c) The Security Service only informs and advises the responsible agency regarding the security of an applicant or employee when requested by the responsible agency.

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5. The following proposal evolved from the series of meetings between [] and British Security Service officials and is presented for your consideration:

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- a) That the NSC Monitoring Service and FBID agree on the required security standards for respective representatives who are to be attached to the other service;
- b) That Mr. FROST assure FBID, in writing, that each nominee for attachment to FBID, or FBIS stations, would be especially rechecked with the British Security Service for his proposed assignment prior to his nomination and that British Security Service information and advice would always prevail. (This policy statement would be very securely held in headquarters, CIA, as any disclosure of this procedure could cause political embarrassment in the United Kingdom);
- c) That in each case when submitting the name of a nominee to FBID, or to an FBIS station, Mr. FROST would state that subject was security cleared for his proposed assignment and that this would mean that action 5(b) above had been taken. He would not in each case specifically state that action as set out in 5(b) above had been taken.

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6. [] has informed [] of the above.

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[]
Assistant Director
Special Operations

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